Henry Kissinger (born in Fürth 1923): Son of a GermanJewish family that escaped from Nazi persecution in 1938. 1968 1975 National Security Advisor of President Nixon, 1973 1977 Secretary of State, 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate for a ceasefire agreement in the Vietnam war. clumsy ungeschickt disclaimer Dementi equilibrium Gleichgewicht incentive Anreiz menace Bedrohung negotiation Verhandlung peninsula Halbinsel perception Wahrnehmung plain deutlich, offensichtlich predominant dominant, beherrschend proverb Sprichwort restraint Beherrschung, Zurückhaltung single-mindedness Zielstrebigkeit, Unbeirrbarkeit to strive sich bemühen, streben nach to tempt hier: heraufbeschwören withdrawal Rückzug 223Washington meets Beijing M 2 Henry Kissinger looks back There is a famous American proverb: “Only Nixon could go to China”. It means that only someone like Nixon, who had a reputation of being strongly anti-communist, could convincingly take up negotiations with China. Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had made the preparations for the visit. 1. Explain why, according to Kissinger, the USA did need Mao’s Communist China in the early 1970s? 2. In line 10 Kissinger states that in the past the USA could choose the moment to get involved in world affairs. Which incidents is he hinting at? He goes on saying that in the sixties and seventies the USA were constantly involved. Give examples for this involvement. t Richard Nixon in China. The President’s meeting with Chairman Mao (left) and at an official banquet with vice Chairman Chou En-lai (right). China was not important to us because it was physically powerful; Chou En-lai was surely right in his repeated protestations that his nation was not a superpower. In fact, had China been stronger it would not have pursued the improvement of relations with us with the same single-mindedness. Peking needed us to help break out of its isolation and as a counterweight to the potentially mortal threat along its Northern border. We needed China to enhance the flexibility of our diplomacy. Gone were the days when we enjoyed the luxury of choosing the moment to involve ourselves in world affairs. We were permanently involved – but not as physically or morally predominant as before. We had to take account of other power centers and strive for an equilibrium among them. The China initiative also restored perspective to our national policy. It reduced Indochina to its proper scale – a small peninsula on a major continent. Its drama eased for the American people the pain that would inevitably accompany our withdrawal from Southeast Asia. And it brought balance into the perceptions of our friends around the world. […] As for the Soviet Union, we made the conventional disclaimer: our policy was not “aimed against Moscow.” But the fact was that it had been the Soviet Union whose menace had brought China and us together; our cooperation reflected a geopolitical reality produced by concern at the growth of Soviet military power. We could avoid provocative actions; we would not be able to eliminate the plain impact of the new relationship. If skillfully handled, it could provide an incentive for Soviet restraint and cooperation; if clumsily administered, it might tempt the very crisis it sought to avoid. 5 10 15 20 3. Find out what Kissinger means by saying “but not as physically and morally predominant as before” (line 8). 4. Kissinger is regarded as the politician who introduced ‘Realpolitik’ to the White House. Discuss this term in the context of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s foreign policy. N u r zu P rü fz e c k e n E ig e n t m d e s C .C . B u c n e r V e rl a g s